The Myth of Self as First Cause: George Eliot and Spinoza on Vulnerability and Determinism
The above link will take you to a recording of the presentation.
Abstract:
The mere consciousness of one’s own actions and desires often activates the myth of the individual as the genesis and originator of decisions, thoughts, and actions. For Spinoza, humans mistake themselves to be the first cause of their actions, ignorant of the preceding chain of causes that determined their thoughts, actions, decisions, and physical being. Understanding, precisely, our vulnerability to our past and then thus understanding our vulnerability in the present and to the future can enable decision-making that arcs our shared trajectories toward actively affecting our world and causing joy as opposed to passively being affected by external causes. As Spinoza argues, any individual cannot purely produce active affects because every individual is necessarily enmeshed in the passive passions of everyday life. We are necessarily vulnerable to being affected and determined by external causes, but, through Eliot and Spinoza, there are mechanisms that offer the possibility of actively affecting others. A necessary component of increasing our capacity and power to act, exist, and affect others is an increase in our power to be affected by others. Any increase in an individual’s power to act and exist is dependent on their vulnerability to the causes of others and their shared history of preceding chains of causes.
George Eliot produced a Spinozist model of vulnerability and community that shapes the ways in which individuals are vulnerable to both increases and decreases in their capacity and power to act and affect others. Eliot examines questions of moral and virtuous decision-making, and the individual and communal acts of engagement with individual and shared histories. Eliot and Spinoza critique the myth of the self as first cause not to display our limits but to increase our shared capacities to positively affect the world.
Presenter bio:
Garrett Besonson is a PhD candidate in English Literature and Criticism at Indiana University of Pennsylvania, specializing in the literary and philosophical works of George Eliot and Benedict de Spinoza. A recent conference presentation includes his paper, “The Politics of Intersubjective Experience: A Vegetal Phenomenology of Noticing,” presented at the Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting for the International Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP) in Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

We use cookies to analyze website traffic and optimize your website experience. By accepting our use of cookies, your data will be aggregated with all other user data.